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through strategic bidding. However, generated power by WPPs is highly random, which may result into 7 
heavy imbalance charges. In markets dominated by wind generators, they would optimize their offered 8 
bids, considering rival behavior. In oligopolistic day-ahead electricity markets, this strategic behavior 9 
can be represented as a Stochastic Cournot model. Wind uncertainty is represented by scenarios 10 
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 2 
Notations 24 
 The main notations used throughout the paper are listed below for quick reference. Other 25 
symbols are defined as required.  26 
A.  Sets or Indices 
g  Set of indices of conventional GENCOs 
d  Set of indices of demands 
w  Set of indices of WPPs 
/n r  Set of indices of buses 
n r  Set of indices of transmission lines 
  Set of indices of scenarios 
g
n  Mapping of conventional GENCOs located at bus n  
d
n  Mapping of demand located at bus n  
w
n  Mapping of WPPs located at bus n  
d
l  Set of indices of 
thl blocks of 
thd demand 
B.  Constants or Parameters 
n rB   Susceptance of line n r  per unit  
max
n rf   Power transfer capacity of transmission line n r  MW  
max
,d lP  Upper limit of 
thl block of
thd demand  MW  
max
gP  Installed capacity of
thg conventional GENCO MW  
max
iP  Installed capacity of 
thi WPP  MW   
,d l  Marginal utility cost of 
thl block of 
thd demand  $ / MW   
g  Marginal cost of 
thg conventional GENCO  $ / MW  
,prob t  Weight (or occurrence probability) of scenario    at time t   
tDF   Demand factor at time t   per unit  
C.  Variables 
,n r tf   Power flow through transmission line n r at time t   MW  
, ,d l tP  Power scheduled to be consumed by
thl block of 
thd demand at time t  MW  
,g tP  Power scheduled to be produced by 
thg conventional GENCO at time t   MW  
, ,i t  Power bought from/sold to balancing market by 
thi  WPP at time t   MW  
, ,i tIC    Imbalance charges of 
thi  WPP at time t   $    
,i tPof  Power offered to day-ahead market by
thi WPP at time t  MW  
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, ,i tP   Power produced by 
thi  WPP in scenario  at time t  MW  
,n t  Voltage angle at bus n  at time t   rad.  
,n t  Locational marginal price at bus n  at time t    $ / MWh  
,n t
   Positive imbalance price at bus n  at time t   $ / MWh   
,n t
   Negative imbalance price at bus n  at time t   $ / MWh   
,
UP
n t   Upward balancing market price at bus n  at time t   $ / MWh   
,
DN
n t   Downward balancing market price at bus n  at time t   $ / MWh   
1. Introduction 27 
Power sector is being restructured worldwide, with an aim to improve system efficiency and 28 
offer economic solutions. At the same time, uncertainties in fossil fuel prices and environmental 29 
concerns are enhancing the quantum of wind power generation [1]. Over the last few decades, 30 
governments over the world are trying to increase the contribution of green energy in electricity 31 
supply, by providing subsides and support schemes [2]. 32 
Evolving deregulated electricity markets are primarily designed for conventional or fossil fuel 33 
generators. These markets operate on a day-ahead timeline, where participants commit their 34 
generated power several hours before actual power delivery. Eventual power delivered by wind 35 
generators differs from their initial commitment due to intermittent nature of wind. Participants 36 
deviating from their committed schedule face penalties. Small capacities and random generation 37 
restrict the WPPs to act as strategic players. They participate in the market as ‘price takers’, and 38 
are not able to affect the market prices. Due to high capital cost and imbalance penalties, they 39 
cannot operate profitably in pool-based electricity markets. Therefore, they are forced to sell 40 
their power through bilateral contracts. 41 
In pool-based electricity markets, conventional generators can increase their profit by optimal 42 
bid formulation using various bidding strategy models. Bidding strategy models are broadly 43 
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classified into two categories, i.e. Game-theoretic and non-game theoretic models [3-19]. These 44 
models become stochastic when uncertainties like demand, unit availability, fuel price, and wind 45 
are incorporated in it [6-10]. Stochastic models developed for optimal bid formulation of WPPs 46 
help to minimize their imbalance cost. With a consideration of forecasting window length and 47 
market closure delay, Markov Probability based stochastic model can determine the optimal 48 
contracted energy level [11], [12]. Multistage stochastic programming approaches suggest 49 
various trading floors to derive the best offering strategy for a wind generator [13]. Uncertainties 50 
such as wind availability, day-ahead market price, adjustment market price and balancing market 51 
price, along with profit risk measures, have been considered. However, wind generators are still 52 
assumed to be price-takers. In addition, focus is on increasing the wind generator’s profit by bid 53 
selection, with minimum imbalance cost. Opportunity cost based analytical approach can 54 
optimize bids of price-taker WPP in forward electricity market [14]. Strategic gaming by WPPs 55 
for bid selection in pool based electricity markets has generally been neglected.    56 
With the present thrust and growth, in the near future, WPPs would increasingly supply power 57 
to an extent of 20% or more of market demand [15]. They would participate in pool based 58 
electricity markets strategically, without any regulatory support and benefits. They would tend to 59 
increase their profit by gaming in the market [16]. Strategic WPP can optimize their offering 60 
strategy either in day-ahead and balancing markets using stochastic mathematical program with 61 
equilibrium constraints approach [17], [18]. The duopoly competition between strategic power 62 
producers, consisting of wind generators as a part of their portfolio, has been modeled using 63 
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints approach [19].  64 
This paper focuses on formulation of optimal offering strategy for multiple independent 65 
strategic WPPs, in a market dominated by intermittent wind generation. Strategic behavior of 66 
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WPPs in network constrained oligopolistic day-ahead electricity markets, considering wind 67 
uncertainty, is modeled using Stochastic Cournot model. In this model, WPPs aim to maximize 68 
profit by offering optimal bids, considering rival behavior and complete information. Imbalance 69 
charges consider strategic WPPs’ profit calculation using location based dual imbalance price 70 
mechanism. Solution of the proposed model is Nash equilibrium, obtained by payoff matrix 71 
approach. Proposed game-theoretic bidding strategy approach is illustrated through two practical 72 
case studies with three independent strategic WPPs.   73 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the market structure, uncertainty 74 
characterization, and stochastic Cournot model are described. Section 3 provides mathematical 75 
modeling of the problem and the simulation procedure. Section 4 includes numerical and 76 
graphical results of testing the proposed model through a comprehensive analysis on three WPPs 77 
located at different locations. In Section 5, relevant conclusions are drawn. 78 
2. Problem Description 79 
2.1 Market Structure 80 
WPPs participate in network constrained pool based day-ahead electricity market, cleared 81 
several hours before actual power delivery. Real-time balance between supply and demand is 82 
maintained by the balancing market, few minutes before power delivery. Independent System 83 
Operator (ISO) manages operation of both day-ahead and balancing market. WPPs are 84 
considered as strategic power producers in only day-ahead electricity market, while in balancing 85 
market they participate non-strategically. WPPs get imbalance charges for their real-time 86 
generation deviations. This consideration realistically reflects electricity markets as electricity is 87 
traded largely on day-ahead timeline. Due to low liquidity of adjustment or intra-day market, 88 
participation of strategic WPPs in this market is neglected.  89 
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Imbalance charges resulting from balancing market are charged to generators causing that 90 
system imbalance. In this work, location based dual imbalance price mechanism is considered 91 
for imbalance charging, as widely used in European markets such as UK’s New Electricity 92 
Trading Arrangements (NETA), Nord Pool, and Iberian Peninsula [2, 11-14].  93 
In a location based dual imbalance price mechanism, generators are charged for their positive 94 
and negative deviation, reflecting system imbalance and their locations. This location based dual 95 
imbalance price mechanism can be treated as a traditional dual imbalance price mechanism for 96 
uncongested systems. For positive system imbalance, other Generation companies (GENCOs) 97 
would like to purchase excess energy at a downward price ,
DN
n t , lower than LMP ,n t  of their 98 
location. In this case, generators producing excess power than scheduled get a downward 99 
payment for their overproduction. On the other hand, generators producing lower than their 100 
scheduled production are penalized as per the LMP. Positive imbalance price (PIP) and negative 101 
imbalance prices (NIP) at a particular location during system surplus are mathematically 102 
expressed as 103 
 , , ,, DNn t n t n tmin                                                                                                                     (1)                                                         104 
, ,n t n t 
                                                                                                                                      (2)                                                                         105 
With negative system imbalance, generators are willing to provide the energy needed to cover 106 
negative imbalance at LMP. In this case, generators producing excess power than scheduled, get 107 
payment for this overproduction as per LMP at the bus where they are located. On the other 108 
hand, generators responsible for negative imbalance are penalized with upward price ,
UP
n t . PIP 109 
and NIP during system deficit are mathematically expressed as 110 
, ,n t n t 
                                                                                                                                      (3)                                                                       111 
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 , , ,, UPn t n t n tmax                                                                                                                     (4)                                                     112 
2.2 Uncertainty Characterization 113 
Stochastic wind speed is considered as a continuous random variable, represented by scenarios. 114 
Scenarios are possible outcomes of the random input, with corresponding occurrence probability 115 
[20], [21]. To generate wind speed scenarios, statistical time series based ARMA model is used. 116 
A typical ARMA ( p , q ) model is expressed as  117 
1 1
1 1
p q
t j t t j t
j j
Z Z    
 
                                                                                                         (5)                                    118 
With p autoregressive parameters 1 2, ,...., p   , and q  moving average parameters 119 
1 2, ,......, q   . The term t is a normal distributed random number with zero mean and  standard 120 
deviation, referred as a white noise or error.  121 
Generated wind speed scenario tZ can be converted into power scenario, using power curve of 122 
wind turbines installed at the wind farm. For accurate representation of any stochastic process, a 123 
large number of scenarios are required. Due to computational complexity and time limitations, 124 
generated scenarios need to be reduced [22], [23]. These reduced scenarios reflect expected 125 
power generated by the WPPs. In this work, only wind power uncertainty is considered, and 126 
other uncertainties like demand, fuel price and unit outage are not considered [7], [8].     127 
2.3 Stochastic Cournot Model  128 
Cournot game theory is a general approach to represent strategic behavior of GENCOs in 129 
oligopolistic electricity markets. GENCOs make decisions independently and simultaneously, 130 
without cooperating with each other. With an aim to maximize profit, each GENCO chooses 131 
quantity bids to be offered, considering rival behavior. Nash equilibrium is a solution of Cournot 132 
model; this is a standoff condition where no GENCO can unilaterally increase its profit by 133 
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changing its production level. Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) is another popular game 134 
theoretical approach to represent strategic behavior of GENCOs in oligopolistic electricity 135 
markets. However, Cournot model is still popular because of its attractive features, such as easy 136 
calculation of equilibrium, computational tractability, flexibility to model physical or bilateral 137 
contracts, and easy incorporation of various technical limits and uncertainties [27]. In addition, 138 
SFE may fail to find any pure strategy equilibrium or may provide multiple equilibrium, when 139 
practical constraints are considered [28].           140 
In a deterministic Cournot model, input variables are scalar and independent, while in a 141 
Stochastic Cournot model, input variables are stochastic in nature or dependent on other 142 
stochastic variables [6-8]. In this paper, Stochastic Cournot model with complete information is 143 
used to formulate bidding strategy of WPPs in oligopolistic electricity market. Each WPP has 144 
complete information about their rivals’ type, payoff function and installed capacity. Due to zero 145 
marginal cost and generation uncertainty, Stochastic Cournot model is most suitable approach 146 
for optimal decision-making of strategic WPPs in oligopolistic electricity markets. 147 
3. Mathematical Formulation 148 
This section provides mathematical formulation of WPP’ profit maximization problem, ISO’ 149 
market clearing problem and Stochastic Nash equilibrium problem. In addition, proposed 150 
simulation procedure is briefly described.    151 
3.1 Wind Power Producer Problem 152 
Consider wi  WPPs participating strategically in a network constrained oligopolistic 153 
electricity market. Each WPP aims to maximize its profit by offering a certain quantity bid. The 154 
profit maximization problem of thi  WPP in a day-ahead electricity market is formulated as 155 
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follows: 156 
 
,
, , , (i), , , ,, , , ,
i t
i t i t t n t i t i t
Pof
Max U Pof Pof prob Pof IC i t

 

 

                                     (6)                                                                              157 
Subject to 158 
max
,0 , ,i t iPof P i t                                                                                                              (7) 159 
, , , , , , , ,i t i t i tP Pof i t                                                                                                     (8)   160 
(i), , , , , ,
, , (i), , , , , ,
, ,
, 0
, 0 , , ,
0, 0
n t i t i t
i t n t i t i t
i t
IC i t
  
   


 


  

      

 
                                                                            (9)                            161 
 Objective function (6) shows the profit of thi WPP, under the assumption that wind power 162 
generation cost is zero; therefore, expected profit is equal to expected revenue. It is assumed that 163 
WPPs individually participate in the market without any control strategy. Each WPP selects 164 
offered power ,i tPof , which maximizes its expected profit, considering imbalance charges. Due 165 
to the presence of multiple strategic power producers in oligopolistic electricity markets, profit of 166 
strategic WPP depends not only on their optimal decisions but also on rival’s decisions 167 
(represented by negative sign). Constraint (7) limits the strategic WPPs’ offered bids in day-168 
ahead electricity market. The maximum value of offered power is equal to the installed capacity 169 
of WPPs, while the minimum power production is considered to be zero. WPP do not generate 170 
any power when wind speed is below cut-in or above cut-out speed of the installed turbines. 171 
Constraint (8) defines the total deviation for each WPP in each scenario and time. Equation (9) 172 
reflects per scenario imbalance charges at a particular time interval for each strategic WPP in 173 
electricity market.   174 
3.2 ISO Market Clearing Problem 175 
 10 
After receiving generation bids from GENCOs and demand bids from consumers, ISO can 176 
solve market-clearing problem optimally to schedule market operation. The mathematical 177 
formulation of day-ahead market-clearing problem with an objective of social welfare 178 
maximization, subject to different technical constraints is detailed below:   179 
, , , ,
d d g
l
d l d l t g g t
d l g
Max P P 
  
                                                                                            (10)                                                            180 
subject to 181 
/r
, , , , ,: , ,
g w d d n
n n n l
g t i t d l t n r n t
g i d l r
P Pof P f n t
    
                                                            (11)                                                                                                                                                                                                                               182 
 , , , , , ,n r t n r n t r tf B n r t n r                                                                                    (12) 183 
max max
, , , ,n r n r t n rf f f n r t n r                                                                                       (13)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               184 
max
, ,0 , ,g t g tP P g t                                                                                                                (14)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 185 
max
, , , ,0 , , ,d l t t d l tP DF P d l t                                                                                                 (15) 186 
, , ,n t n t                                                                                                                     (16)                                                                                                     187 
1, 0,t t                                                                                                                                  (17)                                               188 
Objective function (10) represents social welfare, defined as the difference between 189 
consumer’s and conventional generators surpluses. Since strategic WPPs offer their generation at 190 
zero prices, their bids are always accepted. Equality constraint (11) ensures that sum of 191 
scheduled power from wind or conventional generators, or both, at any particular bus must be 192 
equal to the demand and injected power at the bus. The lagrangian multiplier of this equality 193 
constraint represents LMP at a particular bus. Constraint (12) states that power flow in a 194 
particular transmission line is equal to the product of corresponding susceptance and difference 195 
between voltage angle at sending and receiving bus of line. For the sake of simplicity, DC power 196 
 11 
flow without transmission losses is considered, thus reactive power and voltage security are 197 
neglected. Inequality constraint (13) enforces MW flow limit on transmission lines. Constraints 198 
(14) and (15) impose upper and lower bound on scheduled output of conventional generators and 199 
demand. Hourly demand is obtained by multiplication of demand factor and peak demand. 200 
Constraint (16) represents limits of voltage angle at the buses. Constraint (17) shows that voltage 201 
angle at the reference Bus 1 should be equal to zero.  202 
Balancing market’s upward and downward prices at a particular location can be modeled as a 203 
function of day-ahead LMP [14]. System imbalance depends on sum of WPPs’ excess/deficit 204 
generation at real time.  205 
3.3 Stochastic Equilibrium Problem 206 
This decision-making problem of all strategic WPPs is formulated as a stochastic equilibrium 207 
problem, to maximize their payoff by optimizing their offered quantities considering rivals 208 
behavior. In mathematical terms, stochastic Nash equilibrium is a vector, which solves a 209 
collection of profit maximization problems of the form 210 
   * * *, , , , , wi i i i i iU Pof Pof U Pof Pof i                                                                    (18)                   211 
Nash equilibrium condition (18) shows that payoff of any strategic WPP at optimal strategy is 212 
always greater than or equal to payoff of its other available strategies, while rival decisions are 213 
dependent on their optimal strategies. In stochastic Cournot model, Nash equilibrium is obtained 214 
from resultant payoff matrix comprising of aggregate payoff of each strategic WPP.  Aggregate 215 
payoff can be calculated as summation of product of payoff and scenario occurrence probability. 216 
Cournot Nash equilibrium provides optimal offered bids, considering behavior of rival 217 
generators. Conventional generators and consumers are assumed to be non-strategic and they are 218 
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only considered for market clearing problem.  219 
3.4 Simulation Procedure 220 
This section describes the procedure used for obtaining solution of proposed Stochastic 221 
Cournot model.  222 
Step 1: Time Counter Initialization: Initialize time counter to obtain optimal hourly offers of 223 
WPPs. Time counter starts with 1t  . 224 
Step 2: Scenario Generation and Reduction: Initialize the strategic WPPs’ expected outcome by 225 
generation of scenarios. For scenario generation and reduction, the algorithms proposed 226 
in [23] are used. 227 
Step 3: Stochastic Cournot model: Each WPP has a discrete set of possible offering outputs. 228 
They select only one offer among possible offers, which maximizes their expected payoff 229 
calculated using (6)-(9). To obtain Nash equilibrium, resultant payoff matrix is 230 
constructed with probabilistic information about each scenario. For each combination in 231 
payoff matrix, LMP is calculated by solving market clearing problem (10)-(17). For 232 
resultant payoff matrix, Nash equilibrium is obtained by payoff matrix approach [24]. 233 
This equilibrium gives optimal power output that can be offered by the WPPs. 234 
Step 4: Update Time Counter: For each considered hour, offer for each WPP is obtained. In the 235 
next step, update time counter by 1t   and go step 2.  236 
Step 5: End 237 
4. Case Studies 238 
The present studies consider a network constrained pool-based market, where three WPPs 239 
interact strategically. The results obtained on three-bus system and IEEE 24-bus RTS systems 240 
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illustrate effectiveness of the proposed model for WPPs’ bidding strategy formulation.  241 
4.1 Data 242 
The present study considers three WPPs situated at three different locations, Barnstable, Savoy 243 
and Kingston, of Massachusetts State, USA. Each WPP has a number of wind turbines according 244 
to installed capacity, with commercial 2.5 MW, VENSYS100 turbine installed at 100 m hub 245 
height. Air density and temperature conditions are assumed same for each installed wind turbine. 246 
The used turbine model and its power curve are detailed in manufacturer database [25]. For all 247 
these WPPs, actual wind speed data of August 2005 is taken, publically available at Wind 248 
Energy Center, University of Massachusetts, USA [26]. 249 
Wind uncertainty of each WPP is characterized by scenarios. The estimated parameters’ time 250 
series based ARMA model used for scenario generation is shown in Table 1. For accurate 251 
modeling of wind power uncertainty, 1000 scenarios are generated and then reduced to 10 252 
scenarios for each WPP. From these reduced scenarios, in every hour, each WPP can formulate 253 
its resultant payoff matrix. 254 
---------------------------PASTE TABLE 1 HERE------------------------------- 255 
4.2 Three-bus system 256 
A three-bus system, each with a conventional generating unit and a single load connected with 257 
three transmission lines is considered.  All transmission line has identical reactance 0.13 per unit 258 
and 1000 MW power transmission capacity.  A conventional 350 MW coal, 250 MW oil and 150 259 
MW gas generating unit is connected at bus 1 to 3 respectively. Thus, total capacity of 260 
conventional generating unit is 750 MW. The coal, gas and oil unit can offer their generation at 261 
their marginal cost 40, 50 and 60 $/MWh respectively. A single demand with peak value of 684 262 
 14 
MW is connected to bus 3. Hourly demand profile can be obtained using multiplication of peak 263 
demand to hourly demand factor profile as shown in Fig. 1. The demand is assumed to be elastic, 264 
with 70% bids at 70 $/MWh and 30% bids at 80 $/MWh. Three strategic WPPs, each with an 265 
installed capacity of 100 MW, are considered in this study. These WPPs namely WPP1, WPP2 266 
and WPP3 are connected on buses 1 to 3 respectively. According to considered installed 267 
capacity, each WPP have 40 wind turbines. Wind power’s share is 28.57% of total installed 268 
capacity.  269 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 1 HERE------------------------------- 270 
In order to compare proposed approach, two cases are considered in this work. 271 
Case I: Base Case: In this cse, each WPP offers their forecasted generation in day-ahead 272 
electricity market. For forecasted generation, ISO market-clearing problem (10)-(17) is 273 
solved to calculate LMP, then WPPs’ expected profit and imbalance charges are 274 
obtained using (2)-(9). Rival behavior is not considered in this case for WPPs’ offer 275 
selection. 276 
Case II: Strategic Firms: In Case II, WPPs behave strategically and offer output power, which 277 
gives maximum payoff considering rivals behavior, as obtained by proposed 278 
simulation procedure. In this case, market operation and imbalance price mechanism 279 
are similar to Case I.  280 
Both test cases are simulated on Windows based laptop has a 1.67 GHz, Intel Core 2 duo 281 
processor and 2.50 GB RAM. Simulation for scenario generation and reduction is performed on 282 
MATLAB platform and rest of simulations are performed on GAMS [29] software using CPLEX 283 
12.0 solver.  284 
For the base case, the hourly offered bids of each WPP are shown in Fig. 2. At the first hour, 285 
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power offered by WPP1, WPP2 and WPP3 is 47.1143 MW, 51.0163 MW and 48.8089 MW, 286 
respectively.  287 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 2 HERE------------------------------- 288 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 3 HERE------------------------------- 289 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 4 HERE------------------------------- 290 
Hourly imbalance charges for each WPP are shown in Fig. 3. At first hour, all WPPs face 291 
negative imbalance charges because power offered by WPPs falls short of generated power. 292 
WPP2 and 3 offer zero generation bids at 22 Hours and at 12, 18, 24 Hours, respectively. At 293 
these hours, imbalance cost is zero and WPPs earn revenue for any surplus generation. 294 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 5 HERE------------------------------- 295 
Day-ahead market LMP determined by solving ISO market clearing problem and imbalance 296 
price obtained from location based imbalance mechanism are shown in Fig. 4. Balancing 297 
market’s downward and upward prices are assumed to be 0.70 and 1.20 times of day-ahead LMP 298 
respectively. This assumption is based on historical balancing and spot market prices of Nord-299 
pool and UK electricity market [12]. From these figures, it is observed that PIP is less than LMP 300 
and NIP is equal to LMP during surplus generation, and vice versa. Since all transmission lines 301 
are uncongested in this case, LMP is uniform at all buses. Expected profit obtained by each WPP 302 
is shown in Fig. 5. For the first hour, profit of WPPs 1, 2 and 3 are $1000.25, $1767.89 and 303 
$1009.25, respectively.  304 
In Case II, WPPs behave strategically and consider rival behavior for their offer selection. 305 
They offer power as per Nash equilibrium solution of the proposed Stochastic Cournot model. 306 
Hourly profile of the power offered by different WPPs is shown in Fig. 6. At the first hour, 307 
power offered by WPP1, WPP2 and WPP3 is 28.64 MW, 12.24 MW and 10.08 MW, 308 
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respectively. 309 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 6 HERE------------------------------- 310 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 7 HERE------------------------------- 311 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 8 HERE------------------------------- 312 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 9 HERE------------------------------- 313 
Imbalance charges for the WPPs arise due to deviation between offered and generated power, 314 
as shown in Fig. 7. For the first hour, power generated by WPP 2 and 3 is more than that 315 
originally offered, and hence it earns revenue corresponding to this positive imbalance. 316 
However, power generated by WPP1 is less than their offered power, and hence has to pay 317 
negative imbalance prices. 318 
Fig. 8 shows hourly imbalance charges for each WPP. From this figure, it is evident that at the 319 
first hour, NIP is higher than both LMP and PIP due to negative system imbalance. Hourly 320 
profile of the expected profit for different strategic WPPs is shown in Fig. 9. At the first hour, 321 
profit earned by WPP1, WPP2 and WPP3 are $1146.76, $1813.12 and $1166.44, respectively. 322 
Considering the results obtained from the two cases for the first hour, it is evident that the 323 
proposed Stochastic Cournot model increases profit earned by different WPPs and reduces 324 
imbalance charges significantly. A comparative evaluation of profit earned by different WPPs at 325 
the first hour, as evident from Figs. 5 and 9, shows that the profit of WPPs 1, 2 and 3 increases 326 
by $146.51, $45.46 and $157.18 respectively. This is because WPPs decrease their offered bid in 327 
Case II, as shown Figs. 2 and 6. WPPs behave strategically, and change their offered bids, when 328 
they have the opportunity to earn. As WPPs reduce their offered power outputs, their 329 
corresponding imbalance charges also change.  330 
---------------------------PASTE TABLE 2 HERE------------------------------- 331 
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Profit earned by different WPPs over a period of 24 hours is shown in Table 2. The overall 332 
profit earned by different WPPs increases significantly, when the offered bids are selected by 333 
Stochastic Cournot model. To evaluate the impact of transmission congestion, both test cases are 334 
simulated again by limiting transmission line (1-2) capacity to 30 MW. From Table 2 it is 335 
visualized that daily profit of WPP2 increases while that of WPP1 decreases by 23.96 % and 336 
22.39 %, respectively. Because of congestion, LMP at Bus 2 is mostly higher than LMP at bus 1. 337 
Profit of WPP3 is minimally changed as LMP at Bus 3 is not affected significantly by 338 
congestion. A comparative reflection of the daily benefit earned by each WPP clearly shows that 339 
increase in profit earned by different WPPs would be substantial over a longer period of time. 340 
4.3 IEEE 24-Bus RTS System 341 
To validate the proposed approach on a large system, the two test cases are simulated for 342 
single area IEEE 24-Bus RTS system consisting of 24 buses, 32 generating units, 17 demand and 343 
38 transmission lines. Network configuration, data of generating units, line capacities and 344 
demand is considered from [30]. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that all generating units 345 
located at the same bus can be represented as a single GENCO, with installed capacity equal to 346 
sum of individual generating units’ capacity. Marginal cost of GENCO is equal to average 347 
marginal cost of corresponding generating units. Peak system demand is 2650.50 MW. 348 
Information about conventional GENCOs installed capacities and load distribution across the 349 
system is provided in Table 3. Similar to the three-bus system, hourly demand is considered from 350 
the demand factor profile shown in Fig. 1. 351 
Installed capacity of WPP1, WPP2 and WPP3 is considered equal to 600 MW, 400 MW and 352 
400 MW, respectively. WPP1, WPP2 and WPP3 are connected at buses 7, 13 and 18 353 
respectively. According to considered installed capacities, WPP1 has 240 wind turbines, while 354 
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WPP2 and WPP3 have 160 wind turbines each. Wind power’s share in total installed system 355 
capacity is 29.62%. Uncertainty characterization and other parameters in this study are similar to 356 
that of three-bus system.        357 
---------------------------PASTE TABLE 3 HERE------------------------------- 358 
In this study, base case reflects a similar pattern as that from three-bus system. However, in 359 
this case, the offered bids, imbalances charges, imbalance prices and expected profits have been 360 
modified according to new installed capacities of WPPs and new network configuration.  361 
For Case II, hourly bids offered by strategic WPPs using the proposed stochastic Cournot 362 
model are shown in Fig. 10. At the first hour, power offered by WPP1, WPP2 and WPP3 are 363 
159.36 MW, 126.40 MW and 116.48 MW, respectively. Hourly imbalance charges of strategic 364 
WPPs are given in Fig. 11. At the first hour, WPP1 and WPP2 can earn additional revenue for 365 
their surplus generation while WPP3 gets penalty for its deficit generation. Hourly LMP and 366 
imbalance prices at Bus 7 are shown in Fig. 12. These prices would differ from those at other 367 
buses during network congestion. Hourly profit earned by strategic WPPs is shown in Fig. 13.  368 
From these figures, it is evident that proposed approach is helpful to maximize profit of strategic 369 
WPPs in larger systems.    370 
An understanding of daily profits earned by strategic WPPs in Case II shows that WPP1 earns 371 
a profit of $88949.01 i.e. 11.80 % higher than its profit $79554.78 in Case I. Similarly, WPP 2 372 
and WPP3 daily profits are $95591.80 and $82540.82 respectively in Case II. WPP2 and WPP3 373 
get 15.81% and 15.43% higher profit in Case II, as compared to their corresponding profit 374 
$82540.82 and $61197.44 in Case I. From the obtained daily profit of different WPPs, it is 375 
observed that increment in WPP1’s daily profit is slightly less among WPPs. This is due to the 376 
network topology of 24-bus system. In the 24-bus system, Bus 7 is connected to the system 377 
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through Bus 8 only. Due to limited transmission capacity, this transmission line may be 378 
congested for some scenario of WPP1 generation during off peak demand. Due to congestion, 379 
LMP at Bus 7 is usually less than rest of system LMP, therefore WPP 1 earns less profit as 380 
compared to other strategic WPPs.  381 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 10 HERE------------------------------- 382 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 11 HERE------------------------------- 383 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 12 HERE------------------------------- 384 
---------------------------PASTE FIGURE 13 HERE------------------------------- 385 
5. Conclusions 386 
In a pool-based day-ahead electricity market, strategic behavior of WPPs is modeled by a 387 
Stochastic Cournot model. Wind uncertainty and imbalance costs are considered for evaluating 388 
the expected profit. Wind uncertainty is represented as scenarios generated by ARMA model, 389 
which are reduced by Simultaneous Backward Reduction method, so as to reduce computational 390 
burden. Nash equilibrium is obtained with payoff matrix approach. Proposed bidding strategy 391 
approach is implemented on three and 24-bus system with three WPPs. Historical data of these 392 
WPPs is considered from three different locations at Massachusetts, USA. A comparative study 393 
of two cases on each system shows that consideration of rival behavior in selecting the bid offer 394 
results in a significant increase in the WPPs’ profit. This work considers a near-future scenario, 395 
when system demand would predominantly be supplied by wind generators. The proposed model 396 
can be improved by considering behavior of conventional generators and uncertainties of 397 
demand and price.  398 
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Fig. 1.  Hourly demand factor  466 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Time (h)
O
ff
er
ed
 B
id
s 
(M
W
)
 
 
WPP1
WPP2
WPP3
 467 
Fig. 2.  Bid offered by WPPs for Case I (Three-bus system). 468 
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Fig. 3.  Imbalance charges for each WPPs in Case I (Three-bus system). 471 
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Fig. 4.  LMP and imbalance prices at Bus 1 for Case I (3-bus system). 474 
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Fig. 5.  Expected profit of WPPs for Case I (Three-bus system). 476 
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Fig. 6.  Bids offered by strategic WPPs for Case II (Three-bus system). 480 
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Fig. 7.  Imbalance charges for each strategic WPPs in Case II (Three-bus system) 483 
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Fig. 8.  MCP and imbalance prices at Bus 1 for Case II (3-bus system). 485 
 29 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Time (h)
P
ro
fi
t 
($
)
 
 
WPP1
WPP2
WPP3
 486 
Fig. 9.  Expected profit profile of strategic WPPs for Case II (Three-bus system). 487 
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Fig. 10.  Offered bids by strategic WPPs for Case II (24-bus system). 491 
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Fig. 11. Hourly imbalance charges for Case II (24-bus system). 493 
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Fig. 12.  LMP and imbalace prices at Bus 7 for Case II (24-Bus system).  495 
 33 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Time (h)
P
ro
fi
t 
($
)
 
 
WPP1
WPP2
WPP3
 496 
Fig. 13. Hourly profit earned by strategic WPPs for Case II (24-bus system)  497 
 498 
TABLE 1 499 
WPPS’ TIME SERIES MODEL PARAMETERS 500 
Parameters WPP1 WPP2 WPP3 
Order ARMA (1,0) ARMA (1,1) ARMA (2,0) 
1  0.8693 0.8933 0.6313 
2  - - 0.9711 
1  - 0.0654 - 
Variance  0.5141 0.6048 0.6213 
 501 
TABLE 2 502 
3-BUS SYSTEM: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WIND FIRMS DAILY EXPECTED PROFIT ($)  503 
 Uncongested network Congested Network 
WPPs 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Case I 15790.28 23957.42 18195.53 12254.02 (-22.39) 29697.57 (+23.96) 18201.08 (+0.03) 
Case II 17916.04 27404.76 20668.33 14058.95 (-21.52) 33653.85 (+22.80) 20866.21 (+0.95) 
Increment (%) 13.46 14.38 13.59 14.73 13.32 14.64 
 504 
 34 
TABLE 3 505 
24-BUS SYSTEM: DATA OF CONVENTIONAL GENCOS AND DEMANDS  506 
Bus No. 
GENCO installed 
capacity (MW) 
GENCO marginal cost 
($/MWh) 
% share of total 
demand 
1 152 47.91 3.8 
2 152 47.91 3.4 
3   6.3 
4   2.6 
5   2.5 
6   4.8 
7 300 68.16 4.4 
8   6.0 
9   6.1 
10   6.8 
13 591 66.39 9.3 
14   6.8 
15 215 62.49 11.1 
16 155 33.78 3.5 
18 400 16.98 11.7 
19   6.4 
20   4.5 
21 400 16.98  
22 300 0  
23 660 34.42  
 507 
 508 
 509 
